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Abstract 
Since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, successive regimes in Iran promoted competing conceptions of 
Iranian national identity. However, the policy of promoting nationalism as a state-sponsored ideology that 
excludes Iran’s ethnic and religious diversity remained unchanged. Competing discourses around nation 
building and identity strikingly intersect with the struggle for democratization in Iran. Since the Islamic 
Revolution, the pro-democracy movement in the country takes place on two fronts: the confrontation 
between the conservatives and the reformists, and the challenge posed by the ethnic movements towards 
the oﬃ  cial denial of the ethnic and religious diversity of Iran. This article argues that be they reformist 
or conservative, successive governments in Iran have refused to recognise the multi-ethnic structure of 
Iranian society and the legitimate rights of the ethnic groups. Therefore, a regime change would be unlikely 
to alter the social and political status of ethnic and religious minorities unless the ethnic movements 
and the pro-democracy opposition collaborate. Formation of a common discourse on the question of 
‘Iranianness’ is the primary condition for this to be accomplished.
Keywords: national identity, ethnicity, democratisation, minority rights.
Introduction
The fact that Iran is characterised by diverse ethnic groups, languages, regions and religions has 
generated contested conceptions of nationhood at various stages of Iran’s modern history. Although 
the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural structure of Iranian society goes back to pre-Islamic times, it 
became a signiﬁ cant component of Iranian political life following the Constitutional Revolution of 
1906. Throughout the twentieth century, state building in Iran evolved as a dynamic process, informed 
by diverse conceptions of nationalism, including linguistic, territorial, ethnic and religious ones. 
Varying emphasis on these complementary but often competing articulations of nationalism has 
transformed Iranian politics in radical ways (Kashani-Sabet, 2002, p. 162).
Although the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in 1979 resulted in the triumph of Islam as the 
primary identity marker, it soon found itself in a precarious state as a result of the power struggle 
between the conservative and reformist factions within the regime. Nevertheless, the conservative-
reformist confrontation oﬀ ers only a limited understanding of the contestation of the processes, 
policies and discourses of national identity building in post-revolutionary Iran. It has been shown 
time and again that, be they reformist or conservative, successive governments have refused to 
recognise the multi-ethnic structure of Iranian society and the legitimate rights of the ethnic groups. 
The construction of national identity, thus, became an increasingly problematic task due to the ever-
increasing level of ethnic consciousness among representatives of Iran’s numerous identities, who 
challenge the homogenised understanding of Iranian national identity shared by both the reformists 
and conservatives. 
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Many of the minorities in Iran — the Arabs, Balochs, Kurds and Turkmen — have never embraced 
the uniform Iranian national identity perpetuated by the ruling elites or integrated fully within 
Iranian society (Boroujerdi, 1998, p. 54). The ethnic movements have been constantly suppressed by 
the Islamic regime, which perceived the demands of the minorities as an instrument of separatism. 
Nevertheless, through their growing opposition to the regime’s minority policies since 1979, identity 
groups across Iran have become a crucial force to be reckoned with, turning ethnic mobilisation and 
minority politics into an important space of resistance and movement for political change in the 
country.
The present work provides an overview of the modern history of Iran within the framework 
of Rogers Brubaker’s notion of ‘nationalising states’ in order to account for minority-majority 
relations in the Iranian context. The paper argues that competing discourses around nation building 
and identity strikingly intersect with the struggle for democratisation in Iran. Since the Islamic 
Revolution, the pro-democracy movement in the country takes place on two fronts: the confrontation 
between the conservatives and the reformists, who advocate for competing concepts of sovereignty 
and nationalism, and the struggle of ethnic movements to change the authoritarian essence of the 
political system by challenging the state-led denial of the ethnic and religious diversity of Iran. 
The ethnic movements in Iran are strong, but they realise their fate is intertwined with the 
reformist opposition, as the minorities cannot achieve political change alone. Establishment of 
alliances between the Iranian opposition and ethnic political groups depends on the ability of the 
reformists to develop a more inclusive leadership and a genuine democratic agenda that addresses the 
demands of the ethnic minorities. Formation of a common discourse on the question of ‘Iranianness’ 
is the primary condition for this to be accomplished.
Nationalising Iran: Discourses and Counter-Discourses
Rogers Brubaker (1996) explains the dynamic nature of the nation-building process by referring to 
the term ‘nationalising state’, which highlights the unﬁ nished and ongoing nature of nationalist 
projects pursued by ‘unrealised’ nation-states (p. 114). The nationalising state is understood to be an 
organisational shell that had to be ﬁ lled with national content, bringing population, territory, culture, 
and polity into the close congruence that deﬁ nes a fully realised nation-state (Brubaker, 2011, p. 1786). 
Thus, according to Brubaker’s concept of nation, Iran is not a fully realised nation-state, but rather 
a ‘nationalising state’ that is constituted by a dynamically changing ﬁ eld of competitive position 
or stances adopted by diﬀ erent organisations, parties, movements, or individual ﬁ gures within and 
around the state (Brubaker, 1995, p. 116).
The notion of nationalising states provides a useful conceptual lens through which to understand 
the state-sponsored processes of constructing an overarching societal culture of common values and 
institutions required to promote internal unity. Yet, the concept’s explanatory power is limited in 
that it emerged primarily from the study of post-communist forms of nationalism in Soviet successor 
states. The analytical prism oﬀ ered by the concept of a nationalizing state is embedded in a deeply 
institutionalised ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood that prioritises an ‘ethnicised’ concept 
of nationalism. The state is understood as the state of and for the ethno-culturally deﬁ ned ‘core’ 
nation, whose language, culture, economic welfare and political hegemony need to be strengthened, 
and the justiﬁ cation of such action is compensation for previous oppression (Brubaker, 2011, p. 1786). 
Brubaker’s emphasis on ethno-culturally deﬁ ned core nations derives from his focus on the 
speciﬁ c political and institutional legacy of multinational predecessor polities, which helps explain 
the prevalence of a distinctive kind of nationalizing discourse in the Soviet successor states. In Iran, 
on the other hand, the role played by ethnicity in the state cultivation of a uniform national identity 
was historically limited. Iranian citizenry is a diﬀ erentiated community with important crisscrossing 
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splits in terms of socioeconomic class backgrounds, genders, cultural practices, religions, provincial 
and ethnic ties, and political aspirations (Farhi, 2005,p.  8-9). The ‘essence’ of Iranian political, cultural 
and social life is too multifaceted to be captured solely by the notion of nations built around ‘ethnic 
cores.’ What are crucial to the debate on nationalism in Iran are the ‘counter nationalizing discourses’ 
developed by Iran’s diverse minorities, who highlight ethnicity as their primary identity marker. Their 
demands for linguistic, cultural and political rights have brought the ‘ethnic question’ to the forefront 
of Iran’s political agenda and become a constant reminder of the regime’s failure to establish an 
inclusive democratic polity.
Rather than the notion of ‘nationalising state,’ it makes more sense to speak of competing 
nationalizing discourses and practices in the context of Iranian politics. That would broaden the 
boundaries of nationalising policies beyond the realm of elites in charge of the state and open room for 
considering the ethnic movements in Iran as ‘agents’ as well as ‘subjects’ of nationalising processes. 
Bhabha emphasises the value that lies in displaying the wide dissemination through which the ﬁ eld 
of meanings and symbols associated with national life is constructed (Bhabha, 1990, p. 3). He draws 
attention to the tendency to read the nation rather restrictively, as the ideological apparatus of state 
power, and underlines the often obscured, but highly signiﬁ cant, recesses of the national culture from 
which alternative constituencies of peoples and oppositional capacities may emerge (ibid.). Within 
their encounters with the state, the ethnicities in Iran assigned new meanings and diﬀ erent directions 
to the processes of national identity construction in the country.
Brubaker makes a distinction between the core nation, whose economic and political interests are 
promoted by the state, and national minorities, who are exposed to policies of assimilation/integration. 
Nonetheless, he considers nationalizing policies and practices to be performed exclusively by the 
state elites, while considering national minorities within a narrowly deﬁ ned framework of ‘reactive 
nationalism,’ which assigns them a passive role in their encounters with the state. While reacting to 
the state’s nationalizing policies and practices, however, the national minorities aﬀ ect and reshape 
the legal and institutional structures and political alignments in diverse ways in Iran. This creates 
a ﬂ uid and reciprocal relationship between the minority groups and the Iranian regime and shifts 
attention to the proactive characteristics and transformative potentials of ethnic movements in Iran. 
Linz and Stepan (1996, p 35-3) account for the implications of Brubaker’s notion of nationalising 
states for democratic consolidation and argue that the state elites’ attempts to homogenise 
multicultural societies will harm democratic consolidation. It is true that the homogenizing impact 
of nationalising policies reinforces state authoritarianism, which creates the automatic assumption 
that the question of nationalizing states is a ‘negative’ phenomenon. However, under certain 
circumstances, nationalizing policies may in fact play a ‘positive’ role in preparing a given society for 
transition to democracy. This holds true particularly in multi-ethnic polities like Iran, where national 
minorities challenge the state-instigated homogenised understanding of national identity through 
counter-nationalizing discourses.
The Status of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Iran: From Monarchy to Islamic 
Republic
Iran is the second largest country in the Middle East with a population of approximately seventy-eight 
million (UN Demographic Yearbook 2013). Although the statistics regarding the ethnic groups in Iran 
vary according to diﬀ erent sources, estimates suggest that 51% of Iran’s population is ethnic Persian, 
the rest being Azeris (24%), Gilaki and Mazandarani (8%), Kurd (7%), Arab (3%), Lur (2%), Baloch 
(2%), Turkmen (2%), and other (1%) (Hassan 2007; CIA 2012). The majority of the non-Persian ethnic 
groups live in the border regions of Kurdistan, Turkman Sahra, Sistan and Baluchestan and Khuzestan 
provinces. 
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The Constitutional Revolution of 1906, which can be said to represent the beginning of Iran’s 
modern history, was oriented towards establishing a nation state where language was deﬁ ned as 
the essential component of national identity. In their struggle to form a new political establishment, 
the Constitutionalists adopted the strategy of purifying the Persian language of Arabic terms and 
dissociating Iran from Islam (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990, p. 93). The ethnic and cultural diversity of the 
Iranian society was subsumed under the general notion of the ‘Iranian people’, whose identity was 
deﬁ ned by pre-Islamic history and the Persian language. The local and regional languages were neither 
recognised nor denied.
Yack (1999) contends that nationalisation of the political community has traditionally been 
accompanied by modernisation and nation building (p.105). In the context of the Middle East, the 
nationalising states were largely products of the colonial era, which left its mark on the emerging 
state structures of the region. The external colonial competition that the region was exposed to since 
the 19th century resulted in widespread processes of modernisation and development and the rise of 
the nation state model. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 was a culmination of Iran’s eﬀ orts to 
protect its autonomy vis-à-vis foreign powers in the face of growing colonial pressures. Nevertheless, 
while the resistance against Western domination considerably expanded the ‘anti-imperialist’ scope 
of the Iranian nationalist discourse, the policy of promoting internal unity against external threats, 
ironically, was implemented through the historic vehicle of the rise of Western world power, the 
nation state.
The marginalisation of ethnic diﬀ erences in the Constitutional era revealed the latent authoritarian-
ism of the discourse of modernisation, which required unity and the promotion of a homogeneous 
culture. Gellner argues that with the advent of the modern industrial society in the nineteenth 
and twentieth century, cultural homogeneity emerged as a requirement for the modern state, an 
inescapable imperative that manifests and erupts in the form of nationalism (Gellner, 1983).  This 
‘national’ condition of modernity is exclusive and intolerant, dictating that people who do not have 
the cultural characteristics of the ‘core nation’ are to choose between assimilation and migration 
(Gellner, 1997, p. 240). The Constitutional Law of 1906-07 was silent on the subject of minorities, 
yet the emerging Iranian nationalism soon broke this silence through the oﬃ  cial public discourse, 
particularly after the rise of the Pahlavi State in 1925, with an argument for national revival and 
progress that was premised on the need for political and economic modernization (Vali, 2011, p. 5). 
Reza Shah, who founded the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1925, shaped Iranian nationalism by infusing it 
with a distinctly secular ideology. He established a constitutional monarchy and saw the fostering 
of the idea of ‘one nation’ and ‘one language’ as fundamental to the creation of a modern, uniﬁ ed 
and centralised Iran. The common historical experience of the peoples of Iran and attachment to the 
Persian language were promoted as the two main components of a collective Iranian identity. The 
state ideology advertised ‘Iranians’ as a ‘pure Aryan race’ in order to de-emphasise Arab and Islamic 
inﬂ uences on Iranian history. Hence, during the Pahlavi era, rather than purely ethnic, a civilisational 
and linguistic understanding of the ‘core nation’ was promoted by the state. Pre-Islamic culture and 
Persian language and literature were oﬃ  cially propagated through the state-controlled media and the 
education system. To the detriment of the cultural rights of the minorities, writing in non-Persian 
languages and speaking these languages in public places were declared illegal and were punished 
(Hassanpour, 1994, p. 86).
The policies of territorial centralism and denial of Iran’s ethno-national diversity were forcefully 
pursued by the ﬁ rst Pahlavi state from 1926 to 1941, and then, after a short lull, again by the second 
Pahlavi state, continuing until 1979 (Farhi, 2005, p. 12). The Iranian Revolution and the downfall of 
the monarchy eﬀ ectively did nothing to change this dynamic. Despite the dramatic and signiﬁ cant 
shift from the secular nationalism of the Pahlavi State to the religious focus of the Islamic Republic, 
relatively little change was seen in minority-state relationships (Higgins, 1984, p. 39).
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While deﬁ ning national identity, the Islamic Revolution took a diﬀ erent track but with a similar 
bend by emphasizing religious identity as supranational and supra-ethnic. The new government 
declared ethnic identiﬁ cation to be an oﬀ ense against the overarching Muslim identity, thus, proved 
to be largely negligent of the ethnic issue in Iran, like its predecessor. Islam was taken as the focal 
symbol of identity between the state and the people and the common culture promoted by the 
state (Cottam, 1979; Helfgott, 1980). The revolution oﬀ ered Shia Islam as the main pillar of Iranian 
collective identity, which introduced the Sunni-Shia divide as the key determinant of majority-minority 
relationships.1 Hence, following the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the state deﬁ nition of the 
‘core nation’ took an entirely religious character, which promoted ‘religious nationalising’ as the 
primary dynamic of state-society relations. The primacy of Shi’ism considerably accentuated Sunni 
grievances, including mostly the Turkmen, a minority of Arabs, Balochs and Kurds. Since each of these 
collectivities is also identiﬁ ed as an ethnic group, they constitute a sort of ‘double’ minority: ethnic 
and religious (Elling, 2013, p. 19).
As a state entity, Iran is constitutionally at ease with its ethnic minorities. The Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic established the principle of equality in Article 19, which states that ‘all people 
of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; and color, race, 
language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.’ The Islamic Republican state has neither been 
moved by sweeping laws to restrict minority language publications or cultural activities, nor does the 
Islamic Republic proclaim itself for ethnic Persians in an exclusive way. The constitution recognises 
the national minorities’ right to use their languages in the mass media and education. Article 15 states 
that:
The oﬃ  cial language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Oﬃ  cial documents, 
correspondence, and texts, as well as text-books, must be in this language and script. However, the use 
of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature 
in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian. 
Persian, despite being the oﬃ  cial language, is the mother tongue of barely half of the population 
in Iran. Other languages include Turkic, Kurdish, Balochi, Luri, Arabic, Gilaki, Assyrian, and Armenian 
(Tohidi, 2009, pp. 299-300). The constitution does not obligate — but only allows — the teaching of 
local and ethnic languages in schools. Although the instruction of these languages is allowed in 
addition to Persian, no permanent measures have been introduced in Iran’s education system to 
facilitate teaching in minority languages, nor to teach such languages as a second language (Amnesty 
International, 2008, p. 11). Even if Article 15 is fully implemented, it falls short of guaranteeing the 
full scope of human rights associated with the use of a mother tongue. The article permits the use 
of local languages in media and education so long as they are used in conjunction with Persian. The 
phrase ‘regional and tribal languages’ includes no recognition of the linguistic identities of national 
and ethnic minorities or of a mother language as a fundamental principle.
When analysing the minority politics of the Islamic Republic, it is important to note that the 
central problem lies more with the implementation than the law itself. The aforementioned provisions 
were never fully implemented and had little potency in reality. The essence of the legal problem facing 
Iran’s national minorities is not that there is a body of discriminatory anti-minority or Persian-ﬁ rst 
legislation. Rather, ethnic movements in Iran face the same obstacles confronted by other pluralistic, 
secular political movements in the country — that much law in the Islamic Republic permits arbitrary 
1 The Sunnis and the Shia are the two main branches of Islam. The split originates from a dispute over who should 
lead the Muslim community following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The great majority of Muslims are 
Sunnis (approximately 85-90%). In general the diﬀ erences between the members of the two sects lie in the ﬁ eld 
of doctrine, ritual, law, theology and religious organisation.
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clerical rule and fails to protect basic freedoms (Hicks & Hicks, 2007, p. 212). Constitutional provisions 
establishing the right to freedom of expression, political participation and other basic freedoms are 
rendered impotent by clauses asserting the primacy of undeﬁ ned Islamic interests (p. 212).
The Early Counter Nationalizing Discourses: The Kurdish and Azeri Movements
In his account of post-colonial nationalist regimes, Chatterjee states that no matter how skilfully 
employed, modern statecraft cannot eﬀ ectively suppress the very real tensions that remain unresolved 
(Chatterjee, 1993, p. 169). He draws attention to the movements based on ethnic identities as proofs of 
the incomplete resolution of ‘the national question.’ Although Iran was never oﬃ  cially colonised in a 
way that much of the Middle East was by the British and the French, it was among the primary targets 
of colonial interests in the region. Hence, the dominant characteristics of colonialism, particularly the 
nation-state model exported by the European powers, took root in Iran as much as it did in the rest 
of the Middle East.
The ﬁ rst counter-nationalising discourses facing Tehran emerged in 1945. The Kurdish and Azeri 
national movements erupted as a reaction to the politics of territorial centralism and the cultural 
process of the construction of a uniform Iranian identity pursued by the Pahlavi state since 1925 
(Vali, 2011, pp. 1-2). The rise of the Kurdish and Azeri nationalisms resulted in the establishment of 
two self-governing bodies in northern Iran: The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad and Azerbaijan People’s 
Government. The goals of the Kurds and Azeris were focused on gaining autonomy for their people 
within the territorial limits of Iran and administering their aﬀ airs in their own language. Both 
movements, however, were portrayed by the state as a threat to the territorial integrity and unity of 
the Iranian nation. Furthermore, the fact that the Kurdish and Azeri challenges to the state emerged 
as Soviet-backed movements reinforced the state’s use of anti-imperialist narrative, through which 
Iran’s ethno-national diversity was constantly reproduced as a ‘foreign instigated’ security threat in 
oﬃ  cial state discourses rather than a political question of how to address the demands of ethnic 
minorities for equal rights.  
The Kurdish and Azeri movements of 1945-1946 not only marked the formation of ethnic 
movements in Iran, but also provided an institutionalised framework for the promotion of political 
pluralism, decentralisation of power, provincial and local administrative and cultural autonomy, and 
respect for religious and ethnic diﬀ erences in the country (Vali, 2011, p. 90). In eﬀ ect, these early 
ethnic challenges towards the Iranian state crucially revealed the Pahlavi regime’s failure to forge a 
genuine sense of national cohesiveness, as well as the shortcomings of citizenship and democratic 
political process within the juridico-political framework of Iranian sovereignty. The establishment of 
Kurdish and Azerbaijani autonomous regimes highlighted the crucial problem confronting the various 
collectivities co-existing under the same political rubric in Iran: The focus of the national question 
is less of an identity issue — ‘Who is an Iranian?’ — and more of an institutional matter — ‘How can 
the Iranians of all colors and ethnicities build a common political life and eﬀ ective institutions of 
government?’ (Farhi, 2005, p. 13).  
The autonomous governments of the Azeris and the Kurds were short-lived. Both movements were 
crushed by the Iranian government forces in November and December 1946, respectively. Following 
that, the ethnic movements in Iran remained largely in the background until they reappeared in the 
antimonarchy push that precipitated the 1979 Revolution. The downfall of the monarchy was seen by 
the ethnic groups as a unique opportunity to revive the debate on eﬀ ective governance in Iran and 
push for autonomy and recognition of their cultural rights. Ethnic groups had backed the Islamic 
Revolution and broadly participated in the revolutionary process from the outset. However, the ethnic 
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regions and Tehran quickly became antagonistic as it soon became apparent that the demand of 
various identity groups for the establishment of a democratic republic was not compatible with the 
new regime’s objective of establishing a strong and centralised Islamic state.
Ethnic movements and the State after the Islamic Revolution
After the Islamic revolutionary regime established power, Iran’s Turkmen, Balochs, Arabs, and Kurds 
staged revolts. The demands, despite their diversity, had much in common: The national minorities 
should enjoy autonomy and administer their own social, cultural, linguistic and economic aﬀ airs, 
while the federal government would manage foreign policy,  ﬁ nancial and defense issues (Mojab & 
Hassanpour, 1996, p. 234). With the exception of the Kurdish challenge, the regime put each uprising 
down relatively quickly (Hiro, 1987, pp. 111-113). Although the state succeeded in tackling the ethnic 
uprisings, it lost the ideological and political war against the minority nationalisms. Since the 
proclamation of the Islamic Republic, there has been little support for the Islamic regime, its ideology 
and politics in the ethnic regions of Iran. 
The reasons behind the ethnic uprisings against the Islamic state were easily discernible. When 
the Kurds, Arabs, Balochs and Turkmen put their demands before the Islamic Republic, they were 
told all Iranians are Muslim and ethnic identiﬁ cation is not to be emphasised. However, according 
to Article 12 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the oﬃ  cial religion of Iran is Islam and the 
Twelver Ja’fari School, which establishes Shia Islam as the primary principle of unity. In addition, 
Article 13 of the Constitution recognises only the Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian Iranians as 
religious minorities. Thus, given the Islamic Republic’s Shia exceptionalism as well as its prohibition 
of ethnic identiﬁ cation under the overarching Muslim identity, the Kurds, Balochs, Arabs and Turkmen 
are not able to invoke minority status either as non-Persians or as Sunnis. Having no constitutionally 
recognised identity according to either criterion, they abstained almost unanimously from voting for 
the new constitution after the proclamation of the Islamic Republic. 
The only exception to the antagonistic majority-minority relationships in post-revolutionary Iran 
is the Azeri community, which is the largest ethnic minority group in Iran. The Azeris were among 
the groups that posed an ethnic challenge to the regime during the Pahlavi era because of the state’s 
emphasis on linguistic unity. However, as far as their religious identity is concerned, the Azeris are a 
predominantly Shia community. Therefore, following the establishment of the Islamic Republic, they 
were better integrated into the religio-national identity promoted by the new state than other non-
Persian Sunni groups. After the 1979 revolution, the Azeris, as a Shia community, ceased to constitute a 
threat in the eyes of the new regime. They started to enjoy representation at all levels of the political, 
military, intellectual and religious hierarchy. 
The center-periphery and inter-ethnic dynamics strikingly overlap in Iran. Tehran’s uneven, top-
down and highly centralised development strategy, or as many see it, ‘Persian/Shia-centered’ nation-
state building, has resulted in a wide socioeconomic gap between the center and the peripheries, 
which are predominantly inhabited by the ethnic minority groups. Attributable to its Shia make-up, 
the provinces that comprise Iranian Azerbaijan constitute a major exception to this dynamic. Iranian 
Azerbaijan today has the largest concentration of industry and trade outside of Tehran, as opposed 
to the considerable socioeconomic and political disparity existing between other ethnic regions and 
the Persian center (Wimbush, 1979, pp. 61-81). This uneven distribution of power, socioeconomic 
resources and sociocultural status created long-standing grievances and played a signiﬁ cant role in 
fueling community self-awareness on the periphery (Bradley, 2006, p. 181).
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The Emergence of Ethnic Movements as a ‘Third Force’ in Iran
Opposition to the Islamic government in Iran began to form shortly after the revolution that ended 
the Shah’s reign. The wave of reform that emerged in Iran in the 1990s remarkably crystallised 
the power struggle among the contending forces within the Iranian regime: the reformist call for 
democratisation of the state and the conservative opposition to it. The source of the power struggle 
between the reformist and conservative factions was rooted in the Islamic government’s attempt 
to blend elements of theocracy with those of a republic. The constitution of the Islamic Republic 
embraces two conﬂ icting and competing conceptions of sovereignty. One is the ‘popular sovereignty,’ 
which is inscribed in Article 1 of the constitution and represents the indivisible will of the Iranian 
nation, and the other is the ‘divine sovereignty,’ which represents the paramount status of God’s law.
Confrontation between the popular and divine conceptions of sovereignty created a contested 
arena regarding the question of national identity in Iran. The religio-national identity promoted by the 
conservatives was challenged by the reformists’ opposition against the strict clerical control over law 
and behavior. The reformists tried to marginalise the divine concept of sovereignty in order to give 
the popular-democratic conception its due place in the constitution. To that end, they emphasised 
liberal nationalist ideas and the promotion of basic freedoms and human rights. Many reformist 
intellectuals moved beyond the old paradigms of both a secular Aryan-centered and a religious Shia-
centered, homogenised Iranian identity (Tohidi, 2009,p. 319). Nonetheless, despite the rights-based 
language they adopted, the status of religious and ethnic minorities remained a neglected aspect of 
the reformists’ human rights discourse. The reform movement’s goal of democratising the Iranian 
political culture did not include any signiﬁ cant questioning of the state-sponsored notion of national 
identity that was based on the Shia Islamist exclusionary discourse of the conservatives.
In this context, the emergence of the ethnic movements as a ‘third force’ within the movement 
of change in Iran originated directly from the challenge that minority rights activists posed upon the 
exclusionist and homogeneous understanding of the nation shared by both the conservatives and the 
reformists. Minority rights activists underscore that their ethnic-related demands are inseparable from 
the national demands for greater democracy and socioeconomic development that concern all people 
of Iran (Tohidi, 2009, p. 310). They criticise the reformist intellectuals for their failure to recognise 
Iran’s multiethnic reality and for their reluctance to embrace the ethnic movements’ emphasis on 
pluralism and multiculturalism. 
There has been tension and mistrust between many Iranian pro-democracy and human rights 
activists and ethno-nationalists mainly due to the separatist stigma attached to the majority of 
politically active minority groups in Iran. For ethno-nationalists, the pro-democracy Iranian opposition 
does not aim at genuine political change, but only strives to take control of the state by marginalising 
the conservative faction. On many occasions, human rights activists, intellectuals, and political 
organisations in the opposition were criticised by the minority groups because of their hesitance to 
support the demands of ethnic and religious minorities (Shemirani, 2005). The Marxist-inclined Tudeh 
party, for example, which traditionally had a closer association with the ethnic cause, avoided the 
term ‘nationalities’ in referring to Iran’s minorities in its program (Ghassemlou, 1993, pp. 116-117). 
Other opposition groups such as the Iranian National Republicans or human rights groups such as 
the Center for Defenders of Human Rights in Iran were criticised as well for their failure to openly 
condemn government repression of the ethnic minorities. 
The atmosphere of distrust is particularly strong between the Kurdish political parties and Iranian 
opposition groups. The Kurds are usually viewed more threatening than other ethnic groups in Iran, 
not only because they are more geographically concentrated and a border minority, but also because 
they demand not just a slight readjustment of the state framework, but a major reorganisation 
(Higgins, 1984, p. 58). The most inﬂ uential Kurdish opposition groups in Iran, such as the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and Komala, underscore that the accommodation of the demands 
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of the Kurds and other national minorities within a decentralised structure is the primary condition 
for the achievement of a democratised political process in Iran. In this respect, the Kurdish call for 
democratisation addresses not only the problem of rights and freedoms, but also the question of 
what kind of rule or institutions the Iranian society needs for a more inclusive democracy. Such an 
articulation of ethnic demands generates a new discursive terrain, whereby the ‘ethnic question’ 
becomes one of the important arenas in which democratic and civil liberties in Iran and the struggle 
to build eﬀ ective institutions converge on one another. 
The ethnic movements’ resistance against integration into the Iranian society on the basis of the 
nationalising policies of the state has led to increasing recognition by the regime that should they be 
joined by Shia Persian groups desirous of a secular state and agreeable to a confederacy, the balance 
of support for the Islamic Republic could be severely undermined (Higgins, 1984, pp. 58-59). In the eyes 
of the reformists, on the other hand, as the minorities make up a signiﬁ cant portion of the population, 
they are key actors for improving the chances of success at achieving political change in Iran. Thus, as 
the reform movement was unfolding rapidly during the mid-1990s, the ethnic movements’ potential 
to wield power was a factor that was diﬃ  cult to dismiss by either the conservative regime or the 
reformist opposition.
1997 Presidential Election and the First Wave of Reform
The presidential election victory of Muhammad Khatami, a key leader of the reformist front, on 
May 23, 1997 was unexpected for the conservatives, who had monopolised politics since the Islamic 
Revolution. Khatami’s election not only heightened hopes that he would take Iran in new policy 
directions, but also showed the genuine public demand for democratisation in Iran (Fairbanks, 1997, 
p. 51). During the process that culminated in Khatami’s election victory, the ethnic factor played a 
signiﬁ cant role in shaping the reformist agenda. Challenging both the conservatives’ portrayal of 
Iran’s ethnic problem as ‘artiﬁ cial’ and ‘foreign instigated’, and the reformists’ concerns about ethnic 
separatism, minority groups played a signiﬁ cant role in inﬂ uencing Khatami’s election campaign and 
the presidential election of 1997. 
The focus of Khatami’s presidential campaign was on the rule of law, democracy and inclusion of 
all Iranians in the political decision-making process. Khatami made a concerted eﬀ ort to reach out 
to non-Persian and non-Shia constituencies. His supporters distributed election materials in Kurdish 
and Azeri, and Khatami campaigned on a pledge to expand the language rights of Iran’s non-Persian 
minorities (Shaﬀ er, 2002, p. 219). This theme of inclusiveness and respect for diﬀ erences featured 
prominently in his campaign slogan of ‘Iran for all Iranians’, which implicated a major re-articulation 
of Iranian nationalism. Indeed, the support of minority groups was crucial to his two electoral 
victories. Alongside the youth and women, who were the primary supporters of Khatami, the ethnic 
minority participation in the 1997 election critically showed the potential of these groups to make a 
diﬀ erence on the democratic process in Iran.
At the presidential election of 1997, more than 70% of the population of ethnic regions voted for 
Khatami (Princeton University, 2013). This vast participation was a record in these areas, given that a 
majority of the ethnic minorities refused to vote for the Constitution of the Islamic Republic in 1979 
and predominantly boycotted the previous presidential elections (Khorshidi et al., 2011, p. 148). 
Massive participation in the 1997 elections in the minority provinces was the reaction of ethnic 
groups to Khatami’s mottos and inclusive statements throughout his election campaign. Although 
Khatami’s support of ethnic rights could be seen as a strategy to attract voters, his emphasis on 
democracy, rule of law and political participation was largely a result of the pressure coming from 
minority political groups and the eﬀ orts of the political and civil rights activists in ethnic regions. 
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During his two terms in oﬃ  ce, Khatami failed to realise many of the democratic plans he used as 
slogans. However, the reform process that unfolded during his presidency played a signiﬁ cant role in 
infusing democratic thoughts into society and strengthening liberal demands. Iranian civil society, in 
particular, experienced an important period of rejuvenation during Khatami’s presidency from 1997 to 
2005. Although preserving the advances of this period of reform became increasingly diﬃ  cult after the 
rise of hard-line Islamic Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, the voices of civil society 
that have been gathering steam over the past decade proved to be suﬃ  ciently resilient to nudge the 
reform movement along under conservative rule.
Ethnic Movements in the Post-Khatami Era
After the end of Khatami’s presidency, civil unrest and opposition to the regime’s policies in the ethnic 
regions became an increasingly important component of the growing civil society in Iran. Ethnic 
movements continued to be inﬂ uential in terms of shaping the political agenda in the country, which 
was evident from the presidential candidates’ continued eﬀ orts to address the rights of ethnic and 
religious minorities during their campaigns in the 2005, 2009 and 2013 elections.
The implication of the 2005 presidential election was that the window of opportunity for democratic 
reforms in Iran was closed. Nonetheless, events that have taken place since the election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad as the sixth President of Iran showed that the forces for democratic change continued to 
display considerable dynamism. Developments on the minority rights front were particularly stirring.
In April 2005, the oil-rich Khuzestan province, which is predominantly inhabited by minority Arabs, 
became the scene of severe ethnic clashes. The uprising was against a government plan to alter the 
Arab composition of Khuzestan by transferring a great number of Arabs to other parts of Iran and 
replacing them with non-Arab ethnic groups, and also changing the Arab names of various places and 
streets of this province to Persian names (Tohidi, 2009, p. 313). The fact that the unrest in Khuzestan 
occurred only two months before the 2005 presidential election played an important role in pushing 
the ethnic factor once again to the fore of campaigning in ethnic minority-dominated provinces.
Following the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005, the appointment of a Shia from Sistan, Habibollah 
Dehmordeh, who is known for his hard-line anti-Sunni Islamism, as the governor of Baluchestan 
resulted in an outrage among the Balochs, and two Baloch deputies in the parliament resigned in 
protest (Tohidi, 2009, p. 312). The same year, the Kurds took to the streets when the security forces 
killed and dragged the body of a Kurdish activist Shawaneh Ghaderi throughout the city of Mahabad. 
Mass demonstrations took place in Kurdish towns and villages in July and August 2005 and resulted in 
an untold number of arrests without charge and the death of at least 17 people at the hands of security 
forces (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2012, pp. 11-12). In May 
2006, a wide-spread campaign was organised by the Azeris following the publication of an insulting 
article by a state-sponsored daily. The Azeris also marched in massive numbers in February 2007 in 
observance of the International Mother Language Day, protesting the state-sponsored suppression of 
their heritage and language.
The vitality of developing a more inclusive approach to democracy, which would accommodate 
minority demands, resurfaced once again following the re-emergence of the wave of reform after 
the 2009 presidential election, showing signs that it would make a stronger push to achieve political 
change in the country. Although it was the disputed results of the presidential election that triggered 
the pro-democracy protests in June 2009, it can be argued that the developments on the minority rights 
front during Ahmadinejad’s ﬁ rst term in 2005-2009 played a signiﬁ cant role in providing a pre-existing 
social and political context for the subsequent growth of pro-democracy opposition movements in 
Iran.
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2009 Presidential Election and the Second Wave of Reform
The post-presidential election protests in Iran in 2009, known as the Green Movement, had grown as 
a major popular opposition movement that posed a great challenge to the country’s power structure. 
That was a unique phenomenon since the Iranian Revolution, which took place nearly thirty years 
ago. Approximately three million peaceful demonstrators turned out on the streets of Tehran with 
the slogan ‘Where is my vote?’ to protest oﬃ  cial claims that Ahmadinejad had won the presidential 
election in a landslide (Milani, 2010). Although the movement was born out of the disputed election 
results, it soon embodied the Iranian people’s decades-long yearning for democracy, human rights and 
peaceful change.
Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the two reformist candidates that competed against 
Ahmadinejad, were the recognised leaders of the Green Movement. However, unlike the reform 
process during the Khatami administration, Iranian people who took to the streets in June 2009 were 
ahead of the movement’s political leaders and reﬂ ected the increasing strength of Iran’s emerging civil 
society. The democratic discourse surrounding the Green Movement was shaped by a rejection of the 
existing political system and a strong demand for structural changes. The contradictions associated 
with demanding democratic change within the framework of many anti-democratic institutions 
fundamental to the Islamic Republic were explicitly underscored. Therefore, although they were 
recognised as the leaders of the Green Movement, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi did 
not have a signiﬁ cant role in creating and organising the movement and were only responding to 
sentiment on the street rather than directing it (Wright, 2009, p. 43). 
The rapid transition of the Green Movement from a group of angry voters to a mass movement 
demanding democratic rights revived the age-old state strategy of using the anti-imperialist narrative 
as an instrument for inciting ‘national unity.’ However, the Islamic Republic’s intense eﬀ orts to 
portray the movement as a revolution ﬁ nanced and directed by the West proved fruitless. The Iranian 
people’s construction of their own unique narrative based on denouncing the economic and political 
shortcomings of the regime revealed a historical break with the state and its strategy of promoting 
nationalism through associating domestic problems with external threats. This shift in public attitude 
was evident in the slogans shouted by the protesters: ‘Neither for Gaza nor for Lebanon; my soul is 
sacriﬁ ced for Iran’ (Tafesh, 2012).2
Although the Green Movement created a new and expanded political space for democratic 
opposition in Iran, its declining inﬂ uence in the months following the election highlighted a number 
of drawbacks that the movement suﬀ ered from. Although the inhuman crackdown by the government 
security forces played a major role in suppressing the protests, one signiﬁ cant deﬁ ciency of the 
movement was the lack of widespread support from Iran’s ethnic minorities, including the Kurds, 
Balochs, Arabs, Turkmen and others. The protests remained largely limited to the northern areas of 
Tehran and a few more Persian cities. As the ethnic minorities make up almost half of Iran’s population, 
their reluctance to ﬁ gure signiﬁ cantly in the protests restricted the Green Movement’s struggle for 
power and potential to become a nationwide movement and painted it mostly as a factional conﬂ ict 
among the Shia political elite.
The Green Movement’s unsuccessful campaign outside of Tehran was due in large part to the 
movement’s leaders’ lack of plans on behalf of the Arabs, Azeris, Kurds and the Balochs as well as their 
tendency to steer clear of direct contact with minority political groups in order to avoid charges of 
separatism. Therefore, expectations remained low among the ethnic groups that the leaders of the 
Green Movement would have the political capital to change the authoritarian bend of the regime. 
2 Since the proclamation of the Islamic Republic, Iran’s claim to regional leadership in the Middle East has been 
largely based on projecting power abroad through the policy of providing ﬁ nancial and military assistance to 
groups ﬁ ghting for the Palestinian cause in Gaza and Lebanon. The slogan represents the protesters’ disapproval 
of the policies pursued abroad and demands for reorienting Iranian politics towards domestic problems.
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Wary about their unknown status in the future of the movement, ethnic groups kept their distance 
from the protests despite the fact that they share most of the goals of the Green Movement, such 
as increasing popular representation in government and opening Iranian society for greater internal 
political dialogue.   
After the start of the protests in June 2009, many minority political groups have expressed reluctance 
to put any faith in the Green Movement. The Kurdish Globe, an Erbil-based website aﬃ  liated with the 
Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, declared that the dispute between opposition leaders and 
the government was simply the latest of many internal power struggles among the political elites of 
Tehran, which have existed since the early years of the Islamic Republic (Ghajar, 2010). It was argued 
that a new leader would not have fundamentally changed the government’s position on minority 
rights or its human rights stand. The Kurdish political groups as well as the other ethnic minorities 
in Iran generally showed a reluctance to become involved with the Green Movement in any tangible 
way, opting instead for silence, or, at most, a statement of solidarity. In January 2010, the Democratic 
Party of Iranian Kurdistan issued a statement regarding the Kurdish movement’s stance on the future 
of the Green Movement:
Democracy in its real form can only be obtainable when the national rights of the various nationalities 
are acknowledged explicitly. The Green Movement will succeed if it joins its cause with ethnic minorities. 
But that’s something we believe the Green Movement is, so far, afraid to do. (Medya News, 2010)
On June 7, 2010, Abdullah Mohtadi, secretary general of the Kurdish Komala Party, issued a 
statement aimed at forging solidarity between the Kurds and the Green Movement:
The people of Kurdistan do not demand special rights or beneﬁ ts for themselves. They do not demand 
separation from Iran. Their demands are not outside the common framework of contemporary 
democratic regimes and recognised standards of human rights. The people of Kurdistan rightly demand 
that the eﬀ ective leaders and political and cultural ﬁ gures of the Green Movement and the practical 
activists of the movement, approve and support the demands of the people of Kurdistan, and in so doing 
allay their rather legitimate fears. (Mohtadi, 2010)
The realisation of the Green Movement’s goals, by deﬁ nition, includes the demands of many Iranian 
minority groups for increased self-expression and cultural autonomy. The reformist arguments for 
democratisation and constitutional change, however, have largely left out appreciation and respect 
for ethnic and religious diﬀ erences in the country. That said, throughout the Green Movement, the 
minority political parties were not very assertive in putting their case forward. The political space 
created by the Green Movement provided the ethnic groups with an important opportunity to 
consolidate their position as the ‘third force’ of democratisation in Iran and integrate their demands 
into the emergent grassroots democratic front in the country. Although they criticised the Green 
leadership’s lack of an inclusive discourse to satisfy Iran’s minorities, the ethnic groups did not make 
any signiﬁ cant attempt to become a part of the protest movement by critically challenging the 
dominant positions of both the regime and the reformists and by making their case.
Conclusion
Since the Islamic Revolution, the confrontation between the conservatives and the reformists and 
the challenge posed by the ethnic movements towards the oﬃ  cial denial of the ethnic and religious 
diversity of Iran constituted the two fronts where the struggle for democratisation in Iran takes place. 
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The politicians and activists of both fronts built their case for political change around competing 
discourses of nation-building and identity.
Brubaker’s (2011) emphasis on the contentious relationship between the ‘unrealised’ nation 
states and their national minorities has substantial explanatory power for the case of Iran.  The chief 
concern of the Iranian state has been to ‘nationalise’ its heterogeneous populations by decisively 
bringing them into the national fold, deﬁ ned in terms of the speciﬁ c interests of the ‘core nation’. 
From this perspective, the national minorities constantly appeared to be dangerous threats to the 
nation-building process in Iran’s nationalising agenda. 
Although the core nation is deﬁ ned in diﬀ erent terms at diﬀ erent stages of the modern history 
of Iran, the exclusionary character of Iranian national identity was consistently strengthened. In this 
context, what makes the counter-nationalising discourses of the ethnic movements crucial is that they 
created a signiﬁ cant arena of political mobilization for democratic change and functioned as a constant 
reminder of the Iranian regime’s failure to accommodate the demands of its national minorities. The 
fact that the regime still views most of the ethnic movements as a threat to the territorial integrity of 
Iran proves that the ruling elites did not succeed in having the minorities interiorise the nationalist 
discourse promoted by the state. The unfavorable consequence of this situation is the persistent 
democratic deﬁ cit and authoritarianism in Iran due to continued use of coercion to suppress the 
demands and actions that challenge the programs and policies of nationalisation that have been 
ﬁ rmly in place since the early 20th century.
Although the Islamic regime managed to suppress the protests of June 2009, the pro-democracy 
movement in Iran should be regarded as an ongoing process rather than a failed attempt to challenge 
the government. Since the crackdown on the protests, the Iranian opposition and minority groups 
held several meetings in order to unite the opposition and strengthen the Green Movement. The 
opposition groups, however, showed a general reluctance to address and respond to the minority 
demands for a democratic federalist state as an alternative to the Islamic Republic. Yet, the meetings 
underscored the growing awareness that ethnic groups are a strong and active part of the Iranian 
opposition and that it is imperative for the state to address their demands. Whereas the international 
community has condemned Iran for its human rights record and treatment of minorities both before 
and after the 1979 revolution, this condemnation is now being echoed and reinforced from within Iran 
on an unprecedented scale (Ghanea & Hass, 2011).
Regardless of whether the reformists or conservatives dominate the government, the refusal 
to recognise Iran’s multi-ethnic reality is an inherent problem of the established political order in 
Iran. The position of the newly elected President Hassan Rouhani, who is viewed as a politically 
moderate ﬁ gure, on Iran’s ethnic question only conﬁ rmed this situation. Despite his election motto of 
‘moderation and change’ and his promises to ensure cultural and language rights of minority groups, 
immediately following his election victory, Rouhani stated in a television interview that “Iran is not 
a multi-ethnic state” and “There is only one nation in Iran and that is structured by Islamic system” 
(Rudaw, 2013). Unless the deep-rooted ﬂ aws embedded in the core institutions of representative 
democracy in Iran are eliminated, a regime change would be unlikely to change the social and political 
status of ethnic and religious minorities. That is why it is imperative for the ethnic movements and 
other pro-democracy forces in the country to collaborate under the common theme of changing 
the entire political system. Formation of a common discourse over the deﬁ nition of Iranian national 
identity is the primary condition for the accomplishment of this goal.
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